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Abstract
In China, many entrepreneurs receive strong supports each time their busi-
ness fails. This contradicts existing literature and diers from rare revival else-
where. The major explanation lies in China's unfriendly and unstable policy
environments, due to which business failure per se cannot discern competence.
Therefore, entrepreneurs failing because of policy shocks have the incentive
for extra eorts to build reputation of competence and trustworthiness. This
mechanism prepares a pool of seasoned entrepreneurs who can help alleviate
damages of not only policy shocks, but also such system shocks as business
cycle and sector upgrading, and therefore makes the economy more adaptable.
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1 Introduction
We build a theoretical model to solve an empirical puzzle: why in China many en-
trepreneurs, who fail almost completely several times, get strong supports each time
after their business fails?
In our in-depth interviews with two successful entrepreneurs in Zhongyang County
in North China in October 2007, we were surprised to notice that both of them had
failed several times in their long way of entrepreneurship. At times, they lost almost
all their capital accumulated. However, they managed to revive rather quickly and
others were willing to help them with their businesses. Thereafter, we nd out that
many entrepreneurs in China have similar experiences of failures and revivals.
This phenomenon, on the one hand, contradicts existing literature. According to
the basic economic wisdom, there should be little investment wasted for the ex-losers
because they should be less competent than the average entrepreneurs. Compared
with \fresh" entrepreneurs who have never been nanced, \young" entrepreneurs
whose projects were nanced for the rst time but failed should be deemed less
competent. Therefore, the investors should turn to the pool of \fresh" entrepreneurs
rather than giving the failed \young" entrepreneurs a second chance.1
It, on the other hand, diers from the phenomena of rare revival in many other
countries. Taking France and Japan for example, entrepreneurs who failed can very
rarely get a second chance for supports from others. Therefore reputation can be
built almost only through success.2
The major reason for the puzzle lies in the fact that besides entrepreneur com-
petence, social economic environmental factors also play important roles in the suc-
cesses and failures of businesses. In China, due to unfriendly and unstable policy
environments, business failures per se quite often cannot discern the competence of
entrepreneurs.3 Therefore those entrepreneurs fail due to policy shocks have the in-
centive to make extra eorts beyond their obligations to minimize their supporters'
losses for a reputation of competence and trustworthiness while investors have the
incentive to support such entrepreneurs for future businesses. This phenomenon of
reputation building through failure helps partially alleviate the disadvantages of the
unfriendly and unstable policy environments. In addition, as an unintended conse-
1In Horner (2002), the equilibrium requires the worst punishment { a rm should be abandoned
for merely one bad outcome.
2Robert Boyer told the authors that in France people even think failed entrepreneurs are irre-
sponsible.
3The correlation between success and competence in China is further twisted by the degree
of personal connections, which dierentiate access to government funds for revival, with powerful
ocials. We will not incorporate this variable in our model for two reasons besides consideration for
simplicity. The rst reason is that only exceptionally few privileged entrepreneurs can get insider
information to avoid policy shocks that are often initiated by a tiny circle. The second reason is
that connection only skews rather than changes the correlation between success and competence.
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quence, entrepreneurs survive over failures caused by policy shocks can benet from
their experiences against such system shocks as business cycle and sector upgrading,
and therefore make the economy more adaptable.
There are several related strands of literature. The rst is on individual reputation.
\Bad reputation" models (e.g., Ely and Valimaki 2003; Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine
2008) argue that to avoid falling into the non-trade zone, good type long-run players
have to invest in their reputation. Foreseeing this, short-run players choose not to
participate. Holmstrom (1999) investigates the dynamic incentive problem { the agent
has the strongest incentive to work hard to reveal his managerial ability. As time goes
by, his ability is learned, and thus the reputation eect on incentive also decreases.
Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and Levine (1989,
1992), Ely, Fudenberg and Levine (2004), and others investigate the settings of a
single long-run player and a sequence of short-run opponents { the long-run player
tries to commit to certain reputation type to achieve highest possible utility. Horner
(2002) introduces competition to keep high eorts sustainable.4
The second is on group reputation. Diamond (1989) constructs a model in debt
markets. His key point is that while bad type drops out as time goes by, the reputation
for the remaining agents is driven up. Wang and Zhang (2014) provide a game
theoretical model of group reputation concerning reputation matching in dierent
social contexts. They show that the regime change from acquaintance matching
in small communities to anonymous matching in complex societies tends to cause
rampant corruption and the eectiveness of anti-corruption policies is non-monotonic
with respect to supervision eorts.5
The third is on how managerial reputation aects venture nance. Shane and
Cable (2002) argue that to obtain external nancing, investors often rely on social ties,
through which to get access to private information and social obligations regarding
wealth constrained entrepreneurs.6 Hirshleifer (1993) provides a thorough review of
managerial reputation and investment decision. But he does not address the issue of
social tolerance, which is an endogenous equilibrium result of the strategic interactions
among the investors and entrepreneurs, with respect to failure.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes the equilibrium outcome
of entrepreneur survival when aected only by entrepreneurial competence. Section
3 analyzes the mechanism of reputation building through failure by introducing the
eects of idiosyncratic shocks. Section 4 discusses how entrepreneurial revival sys-
tematically benets the economy. Section 5 concludes.
4Our model is also related to literature on the repeated game with imperfect public monitoring.
See Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for detailed analysis.
5For the literature on reputation loss and recovery, see a recent paper by Fujiwara-Greve, Greve
and Jonsson (2014).
6See Fischer and Reuber (2007) for the reputation formation facing new rms.
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2 Competence-Only Model
2.1 Basic Environment
In this section, we construct a competence-only model to analyze an investment en-
vironment, in which entrepreneurs seek nancing for their investment projects from
investors repeatedly. The notations of Mailath and Samuelson (2006) and Horner
(2002) are employed. Time is discrete, indexed by t = 0; 1; : : : and the horizon is
innite. There is a continuum population of long-lived entrepreneurs with common
discount factor  2 (0; 1), who may be the type of \competent" or \incompetent,"
denoted as type \G" and \B" respectively. There is a continuum of investors with
types indexed by m 2 (0;1), which follows some distribution . An investor's type
is dened by her opportunity cost of participation. Suppose investors are short-lived.
That is, each generation of short-run investors play only in one period, and are re-
placed by another generation of short-run investors in the next period. Thus, the
game is a setting of a group of long-run players and a sequence of short-run counter-
parts' generations.
In each period, each entrepreneur proposes a project and investors choose which
project to invest on or opt out. In the latter case, investors get reservation pay-
o, normalized to zero. Suppose an investor chooses to invest on an entrepreneur's
project. Then the payo is 1 if the project succeeds and 0 if the project fails. For a
\competent" type entrepreneur, the probability for his project to be successful is G.
For an incompetent entrepreneur, the probability for his project to be successful is
B. Assume 0 < B < G < 1. The payo for the successful entrepreneur is V , and
the payo for the failed entrepreneur is W , with V > W > 0. If no one invests on
the project of an entrepreneur, he gets zero.
The common prior proportion of competent entrepreneur among the population
is 0. For simplicity, assume all players are uninformed regarding the types of en-
trepreneurs. The only public history observed is whether or not an entrepreneur is
nanced, and if nanced, whether the project succeeds or fails. Till this point, en-
trepreneurs are passive. Investors are competing with other investors in the same gen-
eration after observing the previous records of entrepreneurs. Further, entrepreneurs
alive in period t remain in the economy in period t + 1 with probability  2 (0; 1).
Each quit is oset by the arrival of a new entrepreneur with the common prior pro-
portion 0 of competence. Therefore, the population size of entrepreneurs remains
constant.
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2.2 Stage Game
Consider the stage game in period t. The historical record of an entrepreneur at
the beginning of period t is denoted by (i; j)t: i successes and j failures, where
0  i  t; 0  j  t; i + j  t. Let (i;j)t represent investors' belief at the beginning
of period t for the entrepreneurs with history (i; j)t to be competent. By Bayes' rule,
the following remark says that if there are more successes, then the posterior belief
to be competent is higher; if there are more failures, then the posterior belief to be
competent is lower.
Remark 1
8 k > i : (i;j)t < (k;j)t
8 l > j : (i;j)t > (i;l)t
As an inference of the remark above, (0;1)t < (0;0)t . This implies that at the
beginning of any period t, investors believe that the \young" entrepreneurs whose
projects were nanced for the rst time but failed are less competent than the \fresh"
entrepreneurs who have never been nanced.
An equilibrium of this game refers to a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in symmetric,
pure, Markovian strategies. Markovian strategies are strategies in which investors'
decisions depend only on their own beliefs about the entrepreneurs' types. At the
beginning of period t, the expected return investing on entrepreneurs with history
(i; j)t is r(
(i;j)t) = (i;j)tG+(1 (i;j)t)B, and the net expected return is r((i;j)t) m
for investorm. The total amount of investment in period t, denoted by xt, depends on
the competition among investors and entrepreneurs. Denote the mass of entrepreneurs
with history (i; j)t who are nanced in period t as N
(i;j)t . Clearly,
X
i;j
N (i;j)t = xt.
Note, (i;j)t has the property of Markovian: the order of successes and failures does
not matter; only the number of successes and failures counts.7
At the beginning of period t, investors have an ordering of (i;j)t . Suppose after the
competition among investors and entrepreneurs, eventually there exists a marginal
type of entrepreneurs with history (i; j)t, such that entrepreneurs with history (i; j)t,
where (i;j)t > (i;j)t , will be nanced; all others with history (i; j)t, where 
(i;j)t <
(i;j)t , will not be nanced. The expected return investing on the marginal type (i; j)t
is r((i;j)t) = (i;j)tG + (1   (i;j)t)B, and the net expected return is r((i;j)t)  m
for investor m. Thus, the total amount of investment in period t, xt = 
 
r((i;j)t)

.
Due to the competition among investors, they must pay some premium d(i;j)t to
the entrepreneurs with history (i; j)t, where 
(i;j)t > (i;j)t . Market clearing requires
7To avoid triviality, assume the population size of entrepreneurs and the mass of investors are
suciently large to ensure the market has an interior equilibrium as in Mailath and Samuelson
(2006).
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d(i;j)t = (i;j)t   (i;j)t . For the marginal type (i; j)t, at least some will be nanced
while others will not, depending upon the availability of investors.8 For the transition
from period t to period t + 1, at the beginning of period t + 1, the historical record
for those who were nanced in period t, with (i;j)t  (i;j)t , will be either (i + 1; j)t
or (i; j+1)t; at the beginning of period t+1, the historical record for those who were
not nanced in period t, with (i;j)t  (i;j)t , will be (i; j)t+1.
2.3 Dynamic Game
The following lemma says that the marginal type will be the \fresh" entrepreneurs
who have never been nanced.
Lemma 1 (i; j)t = (0; 0)t
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, at the beginning of period 0, there is no historical record, (0;0)0 = 0.
The marginal type of entrepreneurs (i; j)0 = (0; 0)0. The corresponding expected
return is r((0;0)0) = r(0) = 0G + (1   0)B. Investors with the opportunity
cost of participation m  0G + (1  0)B will have incentive to invest. The total
amount of investment in period 0, x0 = (r(0)) = N
(0;0)0 .
By induction, assume at the beginning period of t   1 the marginal type of en-
trepreneurs (i; j)t 1 = (0; 0)t 1. Let's check if it is true that at the beginning period of
t the marginal type of entrepreneurs (i; j)t = (0; 0)t. As (i; j)t 1 = (0; 0)t 1, xt 1 = x0.
As assumed, entrepreneurs alive in period t 1 remain in the economy in period t with
probability  2 (0; 1). By Bayesian updating, the mass of entrepreneurs with (i; j)t
such that (i;j)t > 0 is less than x0. Further, as the population size of entrepreneurs
are suciently large, entrepreneurs with (0; 1)t drop out. Investors will turn to the
pool of \fresh" entrepreneurs rather than giving a second chance to the failed \young"
entrepreneurs. One failure will cause the \young" entrepreneurs \drop-out" of the
race. Consequently, the marginal type of entrepreneurs (i; j)t = (0; 0)t.
Similar to period 0, investors with the opportunity cost of participation m 
r(0) = 0G + (1   0)B will have incentive to invest on the entrepreneurs with
history (i; j)t such that 
(i;j)t > (0;0)t = 0. Since
X
i;j
N (i;j)t

(i;j)t>0
< x0 <
x0, there are some \fresh" entrepreneurs being nanced in period t. Still, xt =

 
r((0;0)t)

= (r(0)) = x0. Consequently, we have the following proposition.
The level of investment over time is constant at x0 = (r(0)).
8For simplicity, assume investors will invest on entrepreneurs with higher (i;j)t , even though the
net expected return is the same from all entrepreneurs with (i;j)t > (i;j)t after paying the premium
d(i;j)t .
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Proposition 1 8 t : xt = x0 = (r(0))
2.3.1 Asymptotic Property
The following proposition says that beyond \natural death," only the competent
entrepreneurs will survive while the incompetent entrepreneurs will drop out in the
long run. Eventually, we get into a \mature" period, in which investors believe that
all \old" active entrepreneurs (who get their projects nanced for a long time) are
competent. Due to \natural death," the \old" active entrepreneurs will be replaced
by the \fresh" entrepreneurs at the rate  in each period.
Proposition 2 As t!1,
pGt ! pG  G   B
pBt ! 0
where pGt is the ex ante probability of competent entrepreneurs surviving after t pe-
riods \trial" beyond \natural death"; pBt is the ex ante probability of incompetent
entrepreneurs surviving after t periods \trial" beyond \natural death."
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, from lemma 1, the marginal type is always the \fresh" entrepreneurs.
Failed entrepreneurs will drop out if investors' belief for their competence is smaller
than 0. Further, the share of successes in the amount of trials must be greater than
B to avoid dropping out in the long run. By the Law of Large Numbers, for
the incompetent entrepreneurs, the share of successes in the amount of trials must
converge to B. Therefore, eventually the incompetent entrepreneurs will drop out
even if there is no \natural death."
In contrast, for the competent entrepreneurs, ex ante the probability of dropping
out beyond \natural death" in any period is non-negative, which is smaller than that
for the incompetent entrepreneurs. Thus, pGt is a decreasing function of t and bounded
below by G   B, which is the dierence between the probabilities of dropping out
in period 1 for the competent and incompetent entrepreneurs.
3 Plus-Shock Model
From section 2, we show that one failure is sucient to induce the investors to be-
lieve that the failed \young" entrepreneurs are less competent than the \fresh" en-
trepreneurs. Therefore, investors will naturally turn to the latter rather than giving
a second chance to the former.
But what if business failure per se cannot discern competence?
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3.1 Idiosyncratic Shock
Indeed, besides competence of entrepreneurs, social economic environment factors
can also play important roles on the success or failure of projects. Sometimes, it is
the unfriendly and unstable policy environments that cause failures. In this case,
entrepreneurs may complain that they are not their faults.
Consider a variant from the basic model. Suppose in a society with idiosyncratic
shocks, even though the existence and possible impacts of such shocks are common
knowledge, the exact impact of an idiosyncratic shock on a specic project can be
observed only by the entrepreneur himself. With probability  2 (0; 1) the project
will fail, on top of the competence of the entrepreneurs. Specically, for a competent
entrepreneur, the probability for his project to be successful reduces to (1 )G. For
the remaining probability 1 (1 )G, the project will fail, in which the project fails
due to the idiosyncratic shock with probability G. Similarly, for an incompetent
entrepreneur, the probability for his project to be successful reduces to (1   )B.
For the remaining probability 1  (1 )B, the project will fail, in which the project
fails due to the idiosyncratic shock with probability B.
As investors cannot observe the exact impact of an idiosyncratic shock on specic
projects, one-failure-out is still prevalent. We are at an even worse situation. The
level of investment over time is down to  ((1  )r(0)) <  (r(0)) = x0.
3.2 Reputation Building through Failure
It looks as if we were stuck in the trap forever. However, an entrepreneur fails due to
the unfriendly and unstable policy environments may argue that if it were not for the
idiosyncratic shock, he would have been successful. Subsequently, a signalling device
may be spontaneously generated, such that entrepreneurs failing for idiosyncratic
shocks have the incentive to send out costly signals to separate themselves from
those failing for their own incompetence. For instance, after each failure, the failed
entrepreneur may make a transfer to the investor, which is public information, to
indicate that his failure is due to the idiosyncratic shock and he is trustworthy for
future business relationships.
Consider the stage game in period t. The public record of an entrepreneur at the
beginning of period t is denoted by (i; j; k)t: i successes, j failures, and k \transfer"
signals, where 0  i  t; 0  j  t; i + j  t, k  j. Suppose the entrepreneur is
nanced for his project in period t. If the project is successful, he will be continually
nanced in period t+1, as his public record is improved. Instead, if the project fails,
he is in jeopardy of dropping out if his public record (i; j + 1; k)t+1 is worse than the
marginal type in period t + 1. In this case, he may send out the costly signal after
the failure, such that his public record becomes (i; j + 1; k + 1)t+1 at the beginning
of period t+ 1, to indicate that his failure is due to the idiosyncratic shock and he is
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trustworthy for future business relationships.9
Meanwhile, as the exact impact of an idiosyncratic shock on a specic project
can be observed only by the entrepreneur himself, after the failure, his private record
becomes (i; j+1; k; l)t, where l is the number of failures due to idiosyncratic shocks till
period t. The following proposition shows that there exists a separating equilibrium,
in which only entrepreneurs failing for idiosyncratic shocks (l > k), who are at the
brink of dropping out, have the incentive to send out costly signals, while those failing
for their own incompetence do not.
Proposition 3 Consider an entrepreneur with a public record (i; j; k)t at the begin-
ning of period t. Suppose his project was nanced but failed in period t. His private
record becomes (i; j + 1; k; l)t, where l is the number of failures due to idiosyncratic
shocks till period t.
There exists a C(i;j+1;k)t such that we have a separating equilibrium, in which the
failed entrepreneur, who is at the brink of dropping out with (i;j+1;k)t+1 < 0, has the
incentive to transfer C(i;j+1;k)t to the investor if and only if l > k.
Proof. Let us consider the incentive constraint for the entrepreneur whose project
failed in period t and who is at the brink of dropping out in period t+ 1 with l > k.
 C(i;j+1;k)t + U(i;j+1;k+1;l)t+1 > U(i;j+1;k;l)t+1 = 0 (1)
where U(i;j+1;k+1;l)t+1 is the continuation payo in period t+1 for the entrepreneur who
transfers C(i;j+1;k)t to the investor after period t failure; U(i;j+1;k;l)t+1 is the continuation
payo in period t+1 for the entrepreneur who does not transfer after period t failure.
According to lemma 1, the marginal type is always the \fresh" entrepreneurs. For
the entrepreneur at the brink of dropping out in period t + 1, (i;j+1;k)t+1 < 0, and
hence U(i;j+1;k;l)t+1 = 0.
Further, the incentive constraint for the entrepreneur whose project failed in pe-
riod t and who is at the brink of dropping out in period t + 1 with l  k is as
follows.
 C(i;j+1;k)t + U(i;j+1;k+1;l)t+1  U(i;j+1;k;l)t+1 = 0 (2)
Similar to remark 1, U(i;j+1;k+1;l)t+1 is (strictly) increasing in l. It is easy to see
9Since investors are short-lived, suppose payos for the investors are public information. That
is, the subsequent generations of investors can observe the historical payo records. The costly
\responsible" signal only serves the role of signalling and therefore are purely opportunistic behavior.
Only in the situation that they believe that the failure will cause them to drop out (no future
nancing opportunity), do they have the incentive to send out such costly signals.
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that there exists a C(i;j+1;k)t = U(i;j+1;k+1;k)t+1 , such that10 8 l > k :  C(i;j+1;k)t + U(i;j+1;k+1;l)t+1 > 0
8 l  k :  C(i;j+1;k)t + U(i;j+1;k+1;l)t+1  0
For the entrepreneur whose project failed in period t and who is at the brink of
dropping out in period t+ 1, inequalities 1 and 2 are satised.
Similar to proposition 1, without signaling device, the level of investment over time
is down to  ((1  )r(0)) due to the idiosyncratic shock. With the signaling device,
the entrepreneurs failing for idiosyncratic shocks have the incentive to compensate
the investors. Consequently, the level of investment over time is at a higher level.
Proposition 4 8 t : xt = 
h
(1  ) + C(0;1;0)t
i
r(0)

Intuitively, the amount of investment depends on the marginal type which is the
\fresh" entrepreneurs. As in proposition 3, those \young" entrepreneurs, who were
nanced but failed due to the idiosyncratic shock in period t, have the inventive to
compensate the investors C(0;1;0)t to avoid dropping out. Therefore, the investment
is lower due to the idiosyncratic shock, but partially alleviated through the signaling
process.
4 Benets of Learning
For entrepreneurs who failed due to unfriendly and unstable policy environments, the
experiences of failure provide them not only vivid information on the possibilities
and damage making mechanisms of idiosyncratic shocks, but also the incentive to
reect on how to survive against idiosyncratic shocks and on how to mitigate dam-
ages when failure is inevitable. In addition, if the failed entrepreneurs send out costly
signals and revive under supports of investors, they also acquire knowledge of trust
building. Suppose the reviving entrepreneurs learn from their experience and learn-
ing by experiencing has certain irreplaceable values, then they should have higher
expected returns in business than average. If they apply some lessons learned from
policy shocks against other system shocks, they should be at a greater advantage than
average in times of such system shocks as business cycle and sector upgrading. Ag-
gregately, there should also be system level unintended consequences: ceteris paribus,
compared with an economy where revival is rare, an economy with a pool of seasoned
entrepreneurs experienced with revival should have higher expected returns and be
more adaptable to system shocks.
10By the intuitive criterion, it is not necessary to set the amount of transfer more than
U(i;j+1;k+1;k)t+1 .
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4.1 Higher Expected Returns
Suppose revived entrepreneurs learn from their experience, the impact of an idiosyn-
cratic shock on their future projects should be mitigated. To simplify, we measure
learning with the number of \transfer" signals k. Therefore, the impact of an idiosyn-
cratic shock (k) should be strictly decreasing in k.
Obviously, we have the following proposition: compared with the case without
learning, the expected return is higher with learning for k > 0.
Proposition 5 r((i;j;k)t) is higher with learning for k > 0.
At the beginning of period t, with learning, the expected return investing on
entrepreneurs with public history (i; j; k)t is
r((i;j;k)t) = (1  (k))[(i;j;k)tG + (1  (i;j;k)t)B]
+ (k)[(i;j;k)tG + (1  (i;j;k)t)B]C(i;j+1;k)t1signaling
= [(i;j;k)tG + (1  (i;j;k)t)B][1  (k)(1  C(i;j+1;k)t1signaling)]
where 1signaling is the indicator function of the entrepreneur sending costly signal.
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Similarly, without learning, for k > 0
r((i;j;k)t) = [(i;j;k)tG + (1  (i;j;k)t)B][1  (1  C(i;j+1;k)t1signaling)]
< [(i;j;k)tG + (1  (i;j;k)t)B][1  (k)(1  C(i;j+1;k)t1signaling)]
where  = (0) > (k).
Consequently, with learning, those entrepreneurs sending out costly signals have
higher expected returns and therefore are less likely to drop out and account for a
larger share among the survivors. Hence, we have a virtuous circle . For the economy
as a whole, the expected return will be even higher on average. These are summarized
in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 With learning, those entrepreneurs sending out costly signals account
for a larger share among the survivors. For the economy as a whole, the expected
return will be higher on average.
4.2 System Shock Alleviation
Since the \process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism,"
system shocks such as economic cycle and sector upgrading are inevitable for modern
11Without loss of generality, assume C(i;j+1;k)t is less than 1, the payo from a successful project.
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market economies (Schumpeter 1994 [1942], 83). Suppose in each period with prob-
ability  2 (0; 1) an economy will be hit by a system shock, in which case the entire
economy may collapse. Assume failed entrepreneurs sending out costly signals may
learn from their failures about policy shocks and reect on possible ways to handle
such shocks. Therefore, the impact of the system shock on the economy can be miti-
gated with learning:  (k) strictly decreasing in k, where k is the average number of
\transfer" signals among the population of entrepreneurs who are nanced.
From corollary 1, with learning, those entrepreneurs sending out costly signals
account for a larger share among the survivals. Consequently, we have the following
proposition: compared with the case without learning, the chance for the economy to
collapse is decreasing in case of crisis.
Proposition 6 With learning, k is larger and consequently  (k) is smaller.
This indicates that struggling in the unfriendly and unstable policy environments
may not be that bad. Even though the entrepreneurs may suer from idiosyncratic
shocks, they could develop some signaling devices to alleviate the disadvantages.
Further, through learning, there will be a larger share of \experienced" entrepreneurs
in the economy and therefore a lower chance for the economy to collapse in case of
crisis.
5 Conclusion
Our model oers a new theoretical explanation, reputation building through failure,
to a largely overlooked phenomenon of entrepreneur revival. In societies, such as
China, with unfriendly and unstable policy environments where business failures per
se cannot discern the competence of entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs fail due to pol-
icy shocks have the incentive to make extra eorts to signal their competence and
trustworthiness while investors have the incentive to support such entrepreneurs for
future businesses. The spontaneously generated signaling mechanism of reputation
building through failure helps partially alleviate the disadvantages of the unfriendly
and unstable policy environments. As an unintended consequence, the \experienced"
entrepreneurs produced through this mechanism also help to decrease the probability
of system failure in case of such inevitable system shocks as economic cycle and sector
upgrading. More empirical evidence can be applied to test our results. In addition,
since pure risk is another reason, besides system shock, for competent entrepreneurs
to fail, institutional arrangements friendly for revival to encourage risk taking en-
trepreneurship can bring similar reputation building mechanism without paying the
costs of policy shocks. The comparison between these two mechanisms and their
impacts should be signicant theoretically.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
At the beginning of period 0, there is no historical record, (0;0)0 = 0. The marginal
type of entrepreneurs (i; j)0 = (0; 0)0. The corresponding expected return is r(
(0;0)0) =
r(0) = 0G + (1   0)B. Investors with the opportunity cost of participation
m  0G+(1 0)B will have incentive to invest. The total amount of investment
in period 0, x0 = (r(0)) = N
(0;0)0 .
Continue to period 1 game. The historical record (i; j)1 2 f(1; 0)1; (0; 0)1; (0; 1)1g
at the beginning of period 1. By remark 1, we have r((1;0)1) > r((0;0)1) > r((0;1)1).
As assumed, entrepreneurs alive in period t   1 remain in the economy in period t
with probability  2 (0; 1). By Bayesian updating, the mass of entrepreneurs with
(1; 0)1 is x0[0G + (1   0)B] = r(0)x0 < x0. Further, as the population size
of entrepreneurs are suciently large, entrepreneurs with (0; 1)1 drop out. Investors
will turn to the pool of \fresh" entrepreneurs rather than giving a second chance to
the failed \young" entrepreneurs. Consequently, the marginal type of entrepreneurs
(i; j)1 = (0; 0)1. Entrepreneurs with (1; 0)1 will be continually nanced in period 1.
Due to competition among entrepreneurs, there is no premium paid to the en-
trepreneurs with (0; 0)1: d
(0;0)1 = 0. Since N (1;0)1 = r(0)x0 < x0, entrepreneurs
with (1; 0)1 will get some premium. Market clearing makes d
(1;0)1 = r((1;0)1)  
r((0;0)1), such that the expected returns from both (0; 0)1 and (1; 0)1 are r(0) =
0G+ (1  0)B. Investors with the opportunity cost of participation m  r(0) =
0G + (1   0)B will have incentive to invest on the entrepreneurs with (0; 0)1
and (1; 0)1. The total amount of investment in period 1, x1 = 
 
r((i;j)1)

=

 
r((0;0)1)

= (r(0)) = x0.
By induction, assume at the beginning period of t   1 the marginal type of en-
trepreneurs (i; j)t 1 = (0; 0)t 1. Let's check if it is true that at the beginning period
of t the marginal type of entrepreneurs (i; j)t = (0; 0)t. As (i; j)t 1 = (0; 0)t 1,
xt 1 = x0. Again, entrepreneurs alive in period t   1 remain in the economy in pe-
riod t with probability  2 (0; 1). By Bayesian updating, the mass of entrepreneurs
with (i; j)t such that 
(i;j)t > 0 is less than x0. Similarly, as the population size
of entrepreneurs are suciently large, entrepreneurs with (0; 1)t drop out. Investors
will turn to the pool of \fresh" entrepreneurs rather than giving a second chance to
the failed \young" entrepreneurs. Consequently, the marginal type of entrepreneurs
(i; j)t = (0; 0)t. Entrepreneurs with (i; j)t such that 
(i;j)t > 0 will be continually
nanced in period 1.
Due to competition among entrepreneurs, there is no premium paid to the en-
trepreneurs with (0; 0)1: d
(0;0)1 = 0. Since
X
i;j
N (i;j)t

(i;j)t>0
< x0 < x0, en-
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trepreneurs with history (i; j)t, where 
(i;j)t  (i;j)t > 0 will get some premium.
Market clearing makes d(i;j)t = (i;j)t   0. Investors with the opportunity cost of
participation m  r(0) = 0G + (1  0)B will have incentive to invest on the en-
trepreneurs with history (i; j)t such that 
(i;j)t  (0;0)t = 0. There are some \fresh"
entrepreneurs being nanced in period t. Still, xt = 
 
r((0;0)t)

= (r(0)) = x0
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the surviving rate of the competent and incompetent entrepreneurs beyond
\natural death" in the long run. As a tie breaking rule, assume if investors are
indierent between entrepreneurs with historical record (i; j)t and the \fresh" en-
trepreneurs with record (0; 0)1, they will choose to invest on the former. From lemma
1, the marginal type is always the \fresh" entrepreneurs: (i; j)t = (0; 0)t. Therefore,
entrepreneurs with historical record (i; j)t such that 
(i;j)t  0 will be continually
nanced, while entrepreneurs with historical record (i; j)t such that 
(i;j)t < 0 will
not be nanced.
Thus, entrepreneurs will drop out in period t only if the historical record is (i; j)t
such that 
(i;j 1)t 1  0
(i;j)t < 0
(3)
Once an entrepreneur drops in period t, he will never be nanced again in the future.
Investors will turn to the pool of \fresh" entrepreneurs.
Consider a competent entrepreneur who is nanced in period 0. Suppose he is
continually nanced till the beginning of period t. Let it represent the number of
successes for this entrepreneur till the beginning of period t. Then the number of
failures for this entrepreneur at the same time will be t   it. From inequality 3, we
can identify the sequence of fi1; i2; :::; it ; :::g such that if it < it , he will drop out in
period t.
By Bayes' rule, from inequality 3, it must satisfy the following inequalities.
i

t ;t it 1 =
0
it
G(1  G)t i

t 1
0
it
G(1  G)t it 1 + (1  0)i

t
B(1  B)t it 1
 0
i

t ;t it =
0
it
G(1  G)t i

t
0
it
G(1  G)t it + (1  0)i

t
B(1  B)t it
< 0
These imply

it
G(1  G)t i

t < 
it
B(1  B)t i

t  itG(1  G)t i

t

1  B
1  G

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Denote yt = i

t=t as the share of successes in the amount of trials. The inequality
above can be rewritten as
1  G
1  B

<

B(1  G)
G(1  B)
yt


1  G
1  B
1 1=t
(4)
Dene qGt as the ex ante probability of competent entrepreneurs who were nanced
in period 0 dropping out in period t. At the beginning of period 1, if he failed in
period 0, with record (0; 1)1 he will drop out; if he succeeded in period 0, with record
(1; 0)1 he will be continually nanced. The probability of dropping out in period 1 is
qG1 = 1  G. If he was nanced in period 1, at the beginning of period 2, his record
will be either (2; 0)2 or (1; 1)2. As we assumed before, he will be continually nanced
in period 2. The probability of dropping out in period 2 is qG2 = 0. Continuing to
period t, we have qGt  0.
Dene pGt as the probability of competent entrepreneurs surviving after t periods
\trial." From the analysis above, we have pGt = 1 
tX
s=1
qGs .
Similarly, dene qBt as the ex ante probability of incompetent entrepreneurs who
was nanced in period 0 dropping out in period t. We have qB1 = 1   B, qB2 = 0,
and continuing to period t, qBt  0. Dene pBt as the probability of incompetent
entrepreneurs surviving after t periods \trial" and we have pBt = 1 
tX
s=1
qBs .
Let us consider the asymptotic property of pGt and p
B
t as t ! 1. Clearly, both
pGt and p
B
t are decreasing functions of t and bounded below by 0. Thus, they must
converge. Suppose as t!1, pGt ! pG and pBt ! pB.
By the Log Sum Inequality, we have
B ln

B
G

+ (1  B) ln

1  B
1  G

> 0
which implies 
B
G
B
>

1  G
1  B
1 B
Rearrange and for yt  B we have
B(1  G)
G(1  B)
yt


B(1  G)
G(1  B)
B
>

1  G
1  B

As t!1, the inequality above implies for yt  B we have
B(1  G)
G(1  B)
yt
>

1  G
1  B
1 1=t
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To satisfy inequality 4, we must have: as t!1, yt > B. But by the Law of Large
Numbers, for the incompetent entrepreneurs yt = it=t (the share of successes in the
amount of trials) must converge to B, which is less than y

t . I.e., beyond \natural
death," eventually the incompetent entrepreneurs will drop out in the long run: as
t!1, pBt ! pB = 0.
For the competent entrepreneurs, as t!1, pGt ! pG. We know
pGt   pBt = (1 
tX
s=1
qGs )  (1 
tX
s=1
qBs ) =
tX
s=1
(qBs   qGs )
Note, qBs  qGs for all s. Since qG1 = 1  G and qB1 = 1  B,
pG   pB  qB1   qG1 = G   B
As pB = 0, pG  G   B.
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